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study which its acknowledged superiority to all other literature and his own avowed purpose warrant us in expecting, but has accepted the dicta of the radical critics with little acquaintance with the arguments of conservative scholars.

The counsel given in the chapter on modern dogmatism is good; but it is a two-edged sword, for there is dogmatism in radicalism as well as in conservatism.

N. S. BURTON.

ANN ARBOR, MICH.

DAS DING AN SICH UND DAS NATURGESETZ DER SEELE. Eine neue Erkenntnistheorie. Von ERNST FR. WYNEKEN. Heidelberg: Winter, 1901. Pp. xvi + 446. M. 15.

THIS work is partly an interpretation, partly a modification, of Kant's theory of knowledge. We remember the general uncertainty of Kant's attitude toward the thing in itself; sometimes, by affirming merely that we can know nothing of its character, he seems to imply its existence, while again he seems to affirm that nothing exists beyond the world of phenomena. The object of the work before us is to show both that the thing in itself exists and that we have a positive basis for a statement of its character. This basis is to be found in our self-consciousness. For there we have a real experience both of the thing in itself—the soul or ego—and of its external phenomena. What we find in ourselves we may then infer of the other objects which we know through phenomena only. Their underlying substance and reality must be the same as our own, which is the only form of reality with which we are acquainted or which is ultimately conceivable. Accordingly, the principle underlying the world as a whole must be the conscious principle. Here we have the meaning of the author's title, "The Thing in Itself and the Natural Law of the Soul." But his argument, unlike that of most forms of idealistic philosophy, does not bring him merely to a universal world-soul. On the contrary, from the nature of our individual consciousness, he infers that other objects must, like ourselves, be the expression of individual souls. He thus conceives of the world, after the manner of Leibniz, as an aggregate of monads, or conscious elements, whose interaction results in the phenomena found in experience. Having outlined his hypothesis, he proceeds to apply it in detail to the various problems of science and metaphysics. He seeks to show, in the first place, that it is the hypothesis toward which men are tending in all of the recent philos-

ophy of science ; moreover, that it furnishes the only possible conception of a law of nature and of the relation between structure and function. He then makes it account for the course of our experience and for the nature of our *a priori* conceptions, including among the latter our conception of a tridimensional space. Further applications are to the conception of cause, the difference between the human and the animal soul, and the meaning of teleological judgments ; finally, to the distinction between science and art, and at the same time to the mental differences of men and women. In speaking of the book as a whole, it should be said that it shows a wide acquaintance with the literature both of philosophy and science, and a thorough grasp of philosophical problems ; and, whether we accept or reject the author's conclusions, we shall find his discussions of individual topics generally valuable and suggestive.

WARNER FITE.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

LA DÉGÉNÉRESCENCE BACHIQUE ET LA NÉVROSE RELIGIEUSE DANS L'ANTIQUITÉ. Par J.-PAUL MILLIET. Paris: Édition de "Pages Libres," 1901. Pp. 260. Fr. 3.50.

MR. MILLIET points out that programs of instruction have heretofore been arranged with reference to the rich, while the laboring man has had no opportunity to know either the truth or the beauty derived from the study of history and art. He writes avowedly for laboring men, and his plan is (1) to put before the reader some pages chosen from the masterpieces of ancient literature ; (2) to translate these selections and explain them in the light of the best modern commentaries ; and (3) to show that the most disturbing questions of the present were discussed by the ancients also. Capitalism, militarism, clericalism, and alcoholism are regarded as the principal of the shameful maladies which threaten the life of society ; and alcoholism and religious mysticism are the social scourges singled out for treatment in this volume.

This is the plan of the work, but the historical passages have not been selected with a fair discrimination between history and legend ; in fact, we feel that the author is not sufficiently skilled in historical matters to do this. And the attempt to teach history, and at the same time point a moral in connection with a series of detached passages, leaves a very unorganized impression.

W. I. THOMAS.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.